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Abstract
Modern public transportation companies often record large amounts of information. Privacy can be safeguarded by
discarding nominal tickets, or introducing anonymization techniques. But is anonymity at all possible when everything
is recorded? In this paper we discuss travel information management in the public transport scenario and we present
a revealing case study (relative to the city of Cesena, Italy), showing that even anonymous 10-ride bus tickets may
betray a user’s privacy expectations. We also propose a number of recommendations for the design and management
of public transport information systems, aimed at preserving the users’ privacy, while retaining the useful analysis
features enabled by the e-ticketing technology.
Keywords: Privacy, Public Transport, Sensitive Data Management, Privacy Preserving Technologies
1. Introduction
In 2013, East Japan Railway (JR East), the largest
rail company in the country, announced the intention
to sell to Hitachi corporation a large dataset of its pas-
sengers’ travel histories (Geuss, 2013). This informa-
tion has been gathered by JR East through its propri-
etary e-ticketing system, Suica. The company plans
to anonymize these data by replacing sensitive infor-
mation, such as names and addresses of card owners,
with anonymous ID’s. But is this enough to protect
users’ identities, and therefore their privacy? Histori-
cally, public releases of anonymized personal informa-
tion have often proved to be dangerous for the privacy of
the people that information concerned. In 2006, Amer-
ica On Line (AOL) released anonymized data regarding
the search queries of millions of users of its web search
engine. Even if the IP adresses of the users were re-
placed by anonymous identifiers, researchers and even
journalists had little trouble finding the real names of
people corresponding to the anonymous ID’s, as proved
by the famous case of user #4417749, presented in a
New York Times article (Barbaro and Zeller, 2006). In
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this paper we show how the disclosure of travel histories
can be equally dangerous, as travel data contain a great
deal of information about the user, even when her real
identity is concealed by means of anonymization.
The use of electronic tickets, usually smart cards, in
public transportation networks has a number of poten-
tial benefits, both for the users and the provider of the
transportation service. Often, their introduction also co-
incides with a more general modernization of the trans-
portation infrastructure. Modern networks usually in-
tegrate a positioning system (GPS) for monitoring the
movements of buses and trams, backed by a constant In-
ternet connection to a central control infrastructure. En-
abling location-awareness allows, for instance, to dis-
play real time information and waiting times for each
line on the provider’s website or on information screens
at bus stops and represent a value-added city-to-citizen
service in the smart urban ecosystem (Calderoni et al.,
2012). Internet communication between vehicles and a
central server can also be used to signal traffic conges-
tion or unexpected issues efficiently, in both directions.
These innovations help in making our cities smarter and
greener, by improving the quality and reliability of the
public transport service.
However, the technology enabling these features also
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generates an unprecedented amount of information re-
garding user movements. And after such information
is generated, the tendency among public transportation
companies is to record it, rather than discard it when
it exhausted its original goal. In this paper we discuss
the privacy implications of such a large amount of data,
and we analyze the potential consequences of its dis-
closure. As electronic tickets are generally character-
ized by a unique ID, and all trips are recorded, the in-
formation stored in the information system of a public
transport company is nothing less than a detailed log of
each user’s movements and therefore should be treated
as sensitive information. However, in this paper we
show that even when personal information of the users
are not stored in the system - or are anonymized - the
threat to privacy remains. In fact, combining the data
in the transportation company database with other pub-
licly available source of information can ultimately be
enough to identify a specific user, even in the case of
anonymous tickets.
1.1. Contribution
In this paper we focus on anonymous, disposable 10-
ride electronic tickets for public transportation. Such
tickets can be generally bought anonymously through
resellers or automated machines and, while they are
identified through a unique ID, they do not carry any
information on the owner’s identity. Thus, these tickets
are perceived as the most privacy-friendly by the users
while, at the same time, retaining some of the advan-
tages of personal travel passes, such as a lower cost per
ride than single-ride tickets, and the ability to be used
multiple times. The choice of anonymous tickets allows
us to evaluate the potential effects of disclosure of travel
histories to third parties, even when limited to a small
number of rides and anonymized by removing personal
information.
In this paper we present the case study of a real, city-
wide public transport network in Italy. By analyzing
and decoding the tickets issued by the company, we in-
fer the information collected during their use. We use
this knowledge to show that even anonymized and nu-
merically limited travel histories are indeed enough to
profile users with a great depth of detail. We also show
that careful elaboration of these data, and comparison
with other publicly available sources of information ul-
timately allows to find matching patterns and to statis-
tically identify the user as belonging to a small, well-
defined group. Empirical evidence produced by analyz-
ing this case study proves that simple anonymization of
the travel histories of public transportation users is not
sufficient to protect their privacy, and therefore suggests
caution in the disclosure or trade of such data without
the informed consent of the users themselves. In order
to address this issue, we propose a set of recommen-
dations for the design and management of the informa-
tion systems of transportation companies. Our solutions
are both privacy-preserving and cost-effective, as they
reduce the overhead in communication and storage of
travel data to the information system, while avoiding
costly renovations of current infrastructures.
In this paper we focus on a specific case study (the
Italian city of Cesena and its public transport system)
and we analyze the potential information disclosure for
a specific set of users (university students). However,
the problem we bring to light is indeed common to other
cities and countries. If in this work we use public infor-
mation on students’ classes and housing, the same result
could be achieved, for instance, using phone directories.
Overall, the aim of this paper is not to prove a flaw in
the design of a specific e-ticketing systems, but rather
to show how the disclosure or sale of location-aware in-
formation, such as travel histories, even when anony-
mous (or anonymized) could become dangerous to the
privacy of the concerned individuals: in fact, when data
are combined with other sources of information, the pre-
sumed anonymity disappears.
1.2. Related Works
As discussed by Diaz and Gu¨rses (2012), it is of-
ten difficult for individuals to know how their personal
data are used by companies that hold them. While
Diaz and Gurses mostly focus on sensitive data as de-
fined by European Union regulations, their reasoning
is equally valid when applied to companies collecting
location data such as travel histories, as in the case of
public transportation companies. In fact, users are often
unaware of the risks of malicious surveillance, profil-
ing or manipulation they are exposed to (Avoine et al.,
2010). The security of this information is therefore best
assured adopting the Privacy by Design paradigm, i.e.
providing data anonymity by designing the appropriate
protocols and procedures as hard-coded in the system
itself (Diaz and Gu¨rses, 2012). The privacy-friendliness
of the infrastructure, if correctly implemented, does not
necessarily hinder the business model (Liu et al., 2011).
In the case of public transportation, electronic tickets
raise privacy concerns for their ability to track users.
Recent studies on the subject discuss this issue from
the point of view of security against external attackers
(Asadpour and Dashti, 2011; Avoine et al., 2010; Heydt-
Benjamin et al., 2006; Sadeghi et al., 2008). A typi-
cal attacker is therefore some unauthorized person try-
ing to monitor the movements of a victim, for instance
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Information Time requirements Privacy implications
Pricing
P.1 A sorted list of each stamp performed
by each single identified user, in order to
compute his fare (for travels with connec-
tions, composed of multiple stamps).
Pricing information should be stored for
billing purposes only and thus they
should be deleted after each invoice
issuance.
For billing purposes personal information
of the user might be needed. However,
the short-lived time required to perform
these operations reduces the privacy
implications. Moreover the user is
generally well-aware of the company
disposal of his personal information
required for billing (address, credit card
data, . . . ) as he provided them himself.
P.2 Discounts according to well-defined
categories (students, elderly, people with
disabilities . . . ).
P.3 Zone-based or stop-based discounts
(special tickets, such as airport shuttles,
special events/destinations passes etc.).
Statistics
S.1 Total amount of passengers for each
ride of a line, in order to monitor the line
workload.
This information needs to be stored for a
long time as they are used to perform
statistical analysis, even in a long-term
year-over-year comparisons.
Trip information collected by transport
companies are less sensitive than billing
data, but more invasive for mainly three
reasons. First, the user might not be
aware of the recording and storing of this
information, contrary to the case of
billing data. Second, the information
needs to be stored for significantly longer
periods of time in order to be useful.
Finally, travel histories contain location
information, which imply the users habits
and the places he regularly visits, along
with time and frequencies of the
movements. These are potentially more
invasive to the privacy of the users than
mere financial records.
S.2 A sorted list of each stamp performed
by users during a ride, in order to under-
stand anonymous patterns in user’ habits.
S.3 A sorted list of each stamp performed
by each single user during a single day
in order to understand one-way and return
patterns in users’ habits.
S.4 Total amount of journeys related to
a single ticket, in order to monitor the
workload of a long-term (monthly, yearly)
pass.
Table 1: Information typically handled by public transport companies.
by accessing the records of those movements stored on
the ticket itself (usually a smartcard). For this reason,
the studies usually conclude that no sensible informa-
tion should be kept within the smartcard for longer than
it is actually required for the correct functioning of the
system. This is the case of Avoine et al. (2010), where
the authors discovered, through an analysis of the Mo-
bib smartcard (the public transport pass used in the city
of Brussels, Belgium) the presence of unneeded infor-
mation that could expose users to privacy threats. In
this paper, instead, we are interested in privacy with re-
spect to the company providing the transportation ser-
vice. In a typical scenario of an RFID-based ticketing
system, the smart card ticket is read on the vehicle in
order to learn its unique identifier, which is then sent
from the reader to the central server encrypted (Asad-
pour and Dashti, 2011), usually by applying a collision
resistant hash function to the identifier. Unfortunately,
this allows different stamps to be associated with the
same user and therefore permits tracking (Sadeghi et al.,
2008). In Kerschbaum et al. (2013) the Authors focus
on electronic cash payments and bill processing in the e-
ticketing scenario and discuss how to achieve a privacy
preserving billing system based on asymmetric key en-
cryption while in Peng and Bao (2010) a simple billing
mechanism designed to avoid privacy leaks is proposed.
Basically, it enables the public transport company not to
collect the starting place and the ending one in order to
compute the journey cost. Security and privacy issues
related to Near Field Communication, a very common
technology used for mobile-payments on public trans-
ports, are discussed by Salonen (2011). In Tseytin et al.
(2006), the use of anonymous databases for collecting
user movements is discussed. The authors show, from
a theoretical point of view, that anonymity alone is not
enough to protect users’ privacy. In this paper we pro-
vide a real-world case study confirming their intuition,
and we propose a set of plug-in privacy enhancements
for existing information systems.
1.3. Laws pertaining public information
In this paper we show ways of de-anonymizing travel
histories by comparing them to other sources of infor-
mation. In order to show the viability of this approach,
we use for this purpose only publicly available informa-
tion. The case study we present focuses on Cesena’s
university students: we use therefore information from
the local university dormitories and housing directories.
In the following, we provide legal references showing
how it is, in general, mandatory to maintain this per-
sonal information publicly accessible: this is due to
transparency policies for applicants in merit rankings.
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According to the Italian law D.P.R. 09.05.1994 n. 487
(published on the official gazette n. 185 on August 9,
1994), each ranking list related to a public competition
must be published and accessible to the public. This is
the case for instance of subsidized housing for students
or public housing for disadvantaged people. More gen-
erally, it is commonly stated in law that the protection
of personal data of an individual shall not apply when
the exposure of such information is required by law it-
self for reasons of transparency and public access to in-
formation held by authorities. In practice, some public
lists of various kinds will always be exposed, due to the
need of balancing state responsibilities in terms of trans-
parency and human rights in terms of privacy protection.
1.4. Outline of the Paper
After an introduction concerning information man-
agement in the public transport field, provided in Sec-
tion 2, we discuss how even anonymous tickets can pro-
vide enough information to track the users of a public
transportation network in Section 3. In particular, we
present the case study of the service provided by Start
Romagna in the city of Cesena, while in Section 3.1 we
disclose the data recorded in a MiMuovo ticket after its
use. We show how this information is sufficient to en-
danger the privacy of the users in Section 3.2. We pro-
pose solutions that can help mitigate the privacy issues
we presented in Section 4.
2. Passengers Information Management in Public
Transport
Modern transportation systems integrate monitoring
technology, both location based (GPS) and users based
(smartcard tickets), that generates real time information
on the current status of the transportation network. This
constant flow of information is generally elaborated in
real time, but is also stored and kept, usually indefi-
nitely, by the relevant actors.
Passengers data collected by transportation compa-
nies are used for a number of purposes, with the most
obvious one being ensuring that passengers pay the bus
fare. In general, this can be achieved by verifying the
authenticity of the ticket and its validity for the current
ride, and this kind of checks is only performed during
the ride itself. In modern ticketing systems, however,
information on bus rides is often transmitted to a central
information system, where it is stored for an indefinite
period of time. This allows the company to gather statis-
tics and useful contextualized data that can be used later
to monitor usage, propose modifications to the bus net-
work and adjust frequency, fares, etc (de Grange et al.,
2013). But, as the JR East/Hitachi case shows, these
data are also of increasing interest to external actors,
and therefore have an inherent monetary value. if inter-
nal policies or existing legislation do not prevent this,
it is realistic to predict the emergence of a number of
cases in which this information will be old to external
(and possibly foreign) entities.
In Table 1, we discuss the main information units that
are commonly kept in information systems of public
transport companies (Sampaio et al., 2008). We divide
them in two main subgroups, namely statistics and pric-
ing.
This large amount of recorded data poses an inherent
threat to the privacy of the citizens. This threat is not
necessarily linked to the increased integration of elec-
tronic identification mechanisms. It is in fact the sheer
amount of data that enables tracking and tracing of the
citizens: when everything a person does is registered,
identifying that person among a group is a trivial task.
In the following, we discuss an example of how this
is possible even when the available data are apparently
limited, such as in the case of anonymous 10-ride tickets
for the public transport network of a small city.
3. Case Study: the Cesena Bus Network
The Italian city of Cesena is a small-sized town (less
than 100.000 inhabitants) hosting a university campus.
The campus, part of the Universita` di Bologna, offers
five different majors (computer science, electrical and
bio-medical engineering, architecture, agricultural sci-
ences and psychology) to around 4.000 students (Table
2). The city is served by a bus network, provided by
the regional public transport company Start Romagna,
counting 6 city lines and 13 connections to nearby cities.
The local population of university students is one of the
main customers of the transport network, and benefits
from specific fare discounts.
After a recent renovation of the bus network and the
introduction of electronic tickets (called MiMuovo), an
Major 1st 2nd 3rd Tot.
Agriculture 221 151 207 579
Architecture 133 127 167 427
Psychology 506 606 441 1553
Computer Science 229 140 190 559
Engineering 329 299 407 1035
Total 1453 1350 1458 4261
Table 2: Students enrolled in Bachelor’s degrees offered at the Cesena
Campus, by year (survey for the academic year 2012-13).
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intelligent information system has been put in place by
the transportation company: buses collect information
about the passengers when reading the electronic tick-
ets and send this information, along with their current
position (learned from a GPS receiver) to the central
system. The central system stores these data and up-
dates both the company website and digital information
screens at bus stops with real-time information on wait-
ing times for the different bus lines. This technologi-
cal system offers various advantages to the users: RFID
tickets are faster to stamp, and real-time information on
buses, also available through a mobile application, is
precious for avoiding long waits at a bus stop. However,
the amount of data collected by the system exposes the
users to tracking. Personal tickets, such as monthly and
yearly passes, are directly linked to a user, and both a
government issued ID and the university card have to
be showed upon purchase. Since each use is registered
by the system, they allow the creation of a complete pro-
file of the user’s movements over the years. Many users
may not find this problematic, but others are more con-
cerned about their privacy. A privacy-concerned user
can however opt for a different kind of ticket offered
by the transportation company: an anonymous 10-ride
pass. This ticket retains some of the advantages of
monthly and yearly passes, such as being less expensive
than a single-ride ticket (especially with a student dis-
count), but can be bought anonymously at newsstands
and convenience stores. The user might therefore rea-
sonably expect tracking to be impossible, and conse-
quently a better privacy protection.
3.1. Analyzing an Anonymous Bus Ticket
A 10-ride disposable MiMuovo ticket contains a Mi-
fare Ultralight contactless integrated circuit (IC). Such
an IC belongs to the cheapest memory-based contactless
technologies commercially available. The ticket is noth-
ing more than a 64-byte memory (EEPROM) readable
and writable remotely, through a high-frequency radio
channel. The IC does not contain any mechanism to
protect the access to the memory or to ensure the con-
fidentiality of the stored data. A security mechanism,
though, allows anyone to lock memory areas such that
write operations on these areas are no longer functional
afterward. However, read-access to the memory cannot
be prevented.
The interface of the IC relies on the widely used ISO-
14443 standard, and the memory access is compliant
with the well-known ISO-7816 standard. Reading a
Mifare Ultralight IC is consequently quite easy using
commercial readers and softwares. For example, an
1 5
6
7
3
4 2
Figure 1: Cesena district partitioned into seven areas, according to
which bus line each area is covered by. The bus and train station is in
area 1.
NFC-compliant smartphone with an appropriate appli-
cation (e.g., Tag Info) is enough to read the memory of
a MiMuovo ticket.
Reading the memory actually means “obtaining a ver-
batim copy of the memory”. The content of the mem-
ory is not encrypted but it must be decoded in order to
retrieve the intelligible information. This can be eas-
ily done because the public transportation tickets usu-
ally contain common information, e.g., date, remain-
ing trips, bus line, identity, location, and the encod-
ing method is generally based on public standards, e.g.,
ISO-1545. Performing a differential analysis is usually
enough to complete the full decoding of the ticket: in
such an approach, the ticket is punched a few times,
taking care that only one information (date, location,
bus line,...) varies at a time. This allows identifying
the fields encoded in the memory. Doing so, one can
retrieve the information stored in a MiMuovo ticket.
The memory actually contains 32 bytes of technical data
whose write-access is partially locked, and 32 additional
bytes that are freely modifiable. The latter bytes contain
two 16-byte fields such that they are refreshed cycli-
cally when the ticket is punched. Each field essentially
contains the journey identifier, validation date and time,
connection time, and also the geographical zone. The
zone is a particularly sensitive information in terms of
privacy.
3.2. Breaking Anonymity
We analyze the information collected by an anony-
mous ticket in its geographical context. In particular, we
are interested in the topology of the bus network serving
Cesena. As it is usually the case in small cities, Cesena
is served by a number of bus lines, all of which have the
central bus station as a starting point. From there, differ-
ent lines branch out to reach different areas of the city.
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In general, apart from the city center, no two lines cover
the same area. This allows us to roughly divide the city
in seven zones, according to which line they are served
by. Zone number 1 is the city center, where the bus and
train station are located, while zones numbered from 2
to 5 are neighbors covered by different bus lines. Zones
6 and 7 represent instead suburban locations served by
provincial buses.
As most Italian city campuses, university sites and
lecture halls are spread around the city, with each ma-
jor having a different location. Our partition of the Ce-
sena district also reflects this distribution: in particu-
lar, Psychology and Computer Science are located in
two different buildings both in zone 1, Engineering is in
zone 4, Architecture in 2, while Agriculture is outside
of the city boundaries and therefore served by buses of
zone 6. University buildings are usually best reached
from one specific bus stop. Therefore, users of student-
discounted tickets can be easily divided according to
their major when a significant number of stamps are
made at one of those bus stops. Moreover, the times-
tamps of those stamps can help an observer identify the
year of study of a specific student/bus user: in fact, each
class schedule is different depending on the year a stu-
dent is enrolled in (in Figure 2, the bachelor in Com-
puter Science).
If the student in question is lodged in university hous-
ing (which usually hosts students coming from outside
the region, the most likely ones to use public transporta-
tion) profiling him based on his use of the bus pass can
be even more successful. Places in the dormitories, lo-
cated in zone 3, are assigned through a public selec-
tion whose results are available online. The concur-
rent analysis of this information, all of which is publicly
available, with data collected through bus tickets by the
transportation company can be enough to disclose the
identity of the owner of a bus pass even when the pass
09:00 - 10:00 am
10:00 - 11:00 am
11:00 - 12:00 am
12:00 - 01:00 pm
01:00 - 02:00 pm
02:00 - 03:00 pm
03:00 - 04:00 pm
04:00 - 05:00 pm
Mon       Tue       Wed        Thu         Fri
First year
Second year
Third year
Figure 2: Time and location of classes make years distinguishable.
Here, the schedule for the major in Computer Science.
is supposed to be anonymous, as in the case of 10-ride
tickets.
In fact, according to the most recent report on public
transportation published by the Italian national statistics
institute, ISTAT, the number of university students reg-
ularly using public transportation in the city where their
campus is located is 31% (Istituto Nazionale di Statis-
tica (ISTAT), 2011). This figure is consistent with pub-
licly available data on discounted tickets issued by Start
Romagna for the city of Cesena and, combined with the
numbers in Table 2, means that groups of users sharing
the same characteristics (major, year of study, housing,
...) are composed of a handful of students only.
4. Plug-In Privacy Enhancements
As most of the privacy threats concerning pricing in-
formation can be overcome deleting related data after
each invoice issuance, in the following we focus on raw
data used for monitoring, statistics and similar purposes.
The main aggregate information needed by public trans-
portation providers in these cases are summarized in Ta-
ble 3. Aggregates are basic information needed to com-
pute meaningful statistics.
For example, if the bus company wants to analyze if
the frequency of a bus line is adequate to demand, ag-
gregate S1 is to be used. For this kind of aggregate it
is enough to keep track of the bus line identifier and the
specific ride identifier. Aggregates S2 and S3 are used
instead in monitoring complex usage patterns, such as
frequency and location of stopovers between bus lines
during a single ride (S2) and behavior of the userbase on
an outbound and then inbound journey (called coupled
routes, S3). An abundance of the same entries on ag-
gregate S2 may indicate that a direct link between one
stop and another should be established. Aggregate S3
can instead detect patterns in the behaviors of the users.
For instance, it lets the company understand the route a
user usually takes during his working (or studying) day,
allowing to study one-way and return patterns. In order
to do that, the ticket identifier is also required. Finally,
storing the ticket identifier alone is enough to know the
usage load of a long-term subscription.
Recording this information, however, realizes the
threat to privacy we discussed in the previous section. In
Schwaig et al. (2013) the authors show that consumers
usually consider corporations responsible for any inap-
propriate use of personal information. The organiza-
tion management should therefore enforce adequate in-
formation privacy policies and promote an information
systems emphasizing built-in privacy preserving fea-
tures.
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Aggregate Minimal field set Privacy implications
S1 Passengers for each ride of a line Ride-id, Line-id Uncontextualized trip information. No threat.
S2 Routes (first stamp and changes) Ride-id, Line-id, Timestamp, Stop-id* Exact trip information, but unlinked to the user. Reduced threat.
S3 Coupled-routes (returning ticket) Ride-id, Line-id, Timestamp, Stop-id*, Ticket-id Aggregate requires all sensitive information. The ticket-id must
therefore be removed or encrypted to prevent linking with other
records.
S4 Journeys per ticket Ticket-id Number of rides counted. Implies the frequency a user travels.
Table 3: Aggregates typically used by public transport companies. Each aggregate needs a set of atomic data in order to be computed. Note that as
public transport companies usually know at any time the exact position of each controlled vehicle (thanks to GPS) the field Stop-id can be inferred
from the field Timestamp.
In fact, a well designed system architecture can pre-
vent privacy threats while allowing the same computa-
tions to be performed. In Figure 3 we show three dif-
ferent approaches to the information exchange between
the local recording point (e.g. the bus) and the central
storage system. In the first model, the validation ma-
chine sends to the central server the field set required
to compute the discussed aggregates at the time of the
ticket punch. Data are transmitted in a single atom with
the identifier unencrypted. This basic and unfortunately
commonly used model does nothing to prevent the po-
tential privacy breaches discussed above, as the identi-
fier for the ticket or pass is directly linked to timestamps,
bus lines/stops and so on.
We propose a more advanced and privacy friendly
approach in the second system model. Here the same
data are transmitted to the same remote storage, but
in four different atoms. Each atom contains only the
minimal data set required to compute a single aggre-
gate. Delivering these atoms individually and at dif-
ferent times and encrypting the ticket-id (for aggre-
gate S3) actively breaks the link between the identi-
fier and other information and therefore enhances pri-
vacy. We note that, as aggregate S3 is intended to
monitor daily patterns, the encrypted ticket identifier
has to stay the same only for the duration of the day.
Therefore, we could apply a one-way hash function
on the string "ticket-id"+"yyyy/mm/dd", producing
unique, one-day encrypted identifiers for each different
ticket.
Following these design principles and assuming that
the hardware of ticket punch machines can be trusted,
the privacy by design paradigm is achieved, as the pri-
vacy preserving properties are hard-coded into the sys-
tem itself and the public transportation company only
receives data that are natively anonymized. At the same
time, the company is still able to compute meaningful
statistics. For example, receiving the minimal field set
related to atom S1 (Ride-id, Line-id) separately from
other field sets, does not prevent computing the aggre-
gate Passengers for each ride of a line, but prevents per-
forming an implicit time-based analysis in order to link
this information to information of other atoms.
Finally, the third system model reaches a similar pri-
vacy enhancement by transmitting atoms to different
remote servers, controlled by different business units
within the company or by different companies. In fact,
as described by Jiang and Clifton (2006), distributing
data among autonomous and independent sites provides
protection for individual data. The assumption here is
that different controllers do not collude with each other
by sharing information. In our case, performing a ver-
tical partitioning of data concerning aggregates S1, S2
and S3 (and encrypting the ticket-id in S3 at the server
side) on one side and aggregate S4 on the other, prevents
profile reconstruction by a JOIN operation on the atoms
timestamps or other sensitive fields which could dis-
close the ticket identifier relative to specific routes, tim-
ings and positions. To deploy such a system on an ex-
isting platform, it is sufficient to partition the previously
collected data and to start recording new ones in sep-
arate business units. The most common choice would
be to deploy a relational database via a hosting service.
In order to do that it would be advisable to consider a
database instance with a read replica designed for dis-
aster recovery. The database should be able to support
write-intensive policies and should be up and running
24 hours a day. Focusing on Atom 4 and considering a
64 byte record required to store a single atom, a munici-
pality reporting 1 million validations per day would pro-
duce approximately 2 GB data monthly. However, this
model does not reach the privacy by design paradigm,
as the level of privacy achieved is strictly related to the
trust implied in the parties managing the information,
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Figure 3: Different models for raw information management in the public transport scenario as discussed in Section 4.
for the whole lifetime of the system.
4.1. Costs and potential disadvantages of the proposed
solutions
The proposed systems introduce several benefits con-
cerning user’s privacy, but also come with some poten-
tial disadvantages in terms of costs of deployment and
data processing limitations. In order to deploy the sec-
ond system proposed in Figure 3, it is mandatory to
embed into the ticket punch machines a jitter that in-
troduces randomness in atom delivery times and an al-
gorithm for computing a secure hash function. These
changes usually require a firmware upgrade. However,
should the currently used processor not be capable of
performing such tasks, the hardware upgrade costs are
also to be considered. Depending on the complexity
of the modifications required by the ticket punches and
the data processing strategies applied, an implementa-
tion cost should also be added. For these reasons, the
third system is preferable when privacy needs to be
achieved in an already existing system, as it does not
imply the costs associated with the upgrade of validat-
ing machines already installed on vehicles. In this case,
the only measure involving ticket punches in an exist-
ing system would be a firmware update in order to send
Atom 4 to a different server. The most meaningful cost
introduced in this model is data hosting, a service we as-
sume is provided by a third company. In general, these
costs depend on the current status of the system used by
the company. For instance, buying new compliant ticket
punches could be less cost effective than to upgrade ex-
isting ones. We sum up this considerations in Table 4,
where we propose two different scenarios: in the first
one, the transport company is about to deploy an en-
tirely new system, while in the second one the company
decides to upgrade the existing system instead.
Build from scratch System upgrade
System 2 System design System design, hardware upgrade
or purchase, firmware upgrade,
server-side processing update
System 3 Data hosting Slight firmware upgrade, data
hosting, server-side processing
update
Table 4: Costs introduced adopting the privacy preserving systems
proposed in Section 4. In the build from scratch case we exclude the
purchase of ticket punches as they should be buyed even if a traditional
system would be adopted.
Concerning limitations on data processing, both sys-
tems preserve the ability to compute all the aggregates
proposed in Table 3. Problems may arise if the public
transport company attempts to compare routes belong-
ing to the same anonymous ticket on a basis of more
than one day, in order to study the user’s movements and
learn more complex patterns. This is however exactly
the reason transport companies should introduce such
systems: to guarantee users that their data are not used
for malicious tracking and increase customers’ trust in
public transport systems, and, consequently, encourage
more widespread usage of public transport itself.
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5. Conclusion
The amount of intelligent technology that we use ev-
ery day, knowingly or not, has seen in recent years an
exponential increase. Sensors, smart cards and many
other intelligent devices are now deployed all around
us, and take an active part in shaping our lifestyles. The
amount of information generated or collected by these
devices is enormous, and the fall in prices and great in-
crease in capability of storage devices, made possible
what would have been unimaginable before: keeping
this information indefinitely. While these technological
developments greatly benefit our life, we are still only
beginning to grasp their side effects. The most common
and obvious concern is about privacy: what control do
we have on our personal information, once it has en-
tered the system? Can we really remain anonymous if
we want to?
In this paper we analyze the risks of collecting and
storing passengers information in the context of public
transport. We not only show that real anonymity is al-
most impossible to achieve even when using anonymous
passes, but we also show how the actual amount of data
needed to identify (with some statistical error margin)
and track a user is surprisingly low. In order to show the
realism of this threat, we perform a detailed hardware
analysis of the smart card tickets used by the transporta-
tion company Start Romagna (active in the city of Ce-
sena, Italy), and we identify the information stored in
the chip after each use of anonymous, disposable 10-
ride tickets. This allows us to learn what information
is collected at each validation and, since these data are
then sent to the company databases and stored, to have
a clear picture of what information is available to the
public transportation company.
In light of this knowledge, we analyze the possible
uses of this information: we discuss both the legiti-
mate goals of monitoring traffic in order to improve
the service and collect statistics by the company and
the malicious tracking capabilities of an evil actor. We
also analyze the current implementation of the infor-
mation system that collects, stores and processes this
information, and its privacy implications. Since the
aim of this study is to improve the state of the art
and build privacy-preserving public transport informa-
tion systems, we propose management recommenda-
tions and system models that can achieve the same le-
gitimate goals in a more privacy-friendly way, without
any need of modifying the current infrastructure.
While the threat we discuss in this work is specific to
the infrastructure of public transport in Cesena, this ex-
periment brings to light problems that are common to all
e-ticketing systems that store travel histories. By show-
ing how to de-anonymize travel histories of the passen-
gers, we stress how important it is to get prior informed
consent of the users before disclosing or selling even
anonymized extracts of such data. Having been able to
recognize users by comparing only to limited, publicly
accessible information, we also pose the problem of
what could be actually achieved in case the same anal-
ysis was to be performed by companies or other entities
that have also access to data generated by social media
(social networks, location-aware applications, etc.). We
can only speculate how big a threat to users’ privacy the
unchecked sale of travel histories might become.
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